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annual meeting of the National Council on Public 
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Prologue 
In 1985, Mr David Grenville, secretary of the Royal 
Commission that investigated the loss of the Ocean 
Ranger drilling rig, arranged to donate the objects 
collected as part of the investigation to the Canada 
Science and Technology Museum. He had two 
rea sons for taking this action. Litigation relating 
to the disaster was still in progress, as victims’ fami-
lies attempted to win some compensation from 
ODECO, the owners of the rig. Parts of the collection 
might be needed as evidence and its integrity had 
to be protected. The Museum had the expertise to 
do this. A second and, I believe, secondary reason, 
for giving us the collection was its “historic and 
technological significance.”1 In correspondence 
with the Museum’s director, Grenville stated “that 
some thought should be given to putting together 
an exhibit,” before the collection, in his words, “is 
archived and forgotten.”2 
But the Museum has never exhibited the collec -
tion3 and, having read the compelling story of this 
disaster, I wondered why. When I began to look at 
the contents and character of the collection and talk 
to my colleagues about it, though, it be soon became 
clear that it not only posed significant museolog -
ical challenges but also raised some fundamental 
questions about how we present modern tech -
nology in exhibits. The purpose of this paper is 
to discuss some of the issues raised by the Ocean 
Ranger collection. 
The Disaster 
In the early hours of 15 February 1982, the Ocean 
Ranger drilling rig capsized and sank off the 
Grand Banks of Newfoundland. All eighty-four of 
its crew died in the icy waters of the North Atlantic. 
The loss was an enormous blow to the people of 
Newfoundland and Labrador; fifty-six of the 
eighty-four crew members were from this small 
and “tightly-knit maritime community”4 and many 
residents could claim some connection to at least 
one of those lost. The disaster also dealt a severe 
blow to the optimism that had accompanied the dis-
covery of the Hibernia oil field. The promise of jobs 
and a new source of revenue for a province plagued 
by chronically high unemployment and the decline 
of traditional industries like the fishery was real, 
but it came at a cost. 
The offshore oil and gas industry felt the shock 
waves too. The Ocean Ranger was the largest self-
propelled semisubmersible offshore drilling rig in 
the world at the time of her launch in 1976 and many 
in the industry considered this state-of-the-art unit 
“unsinkable.”5 She had a history of drilling safely 
in weather conditions that forced other rigs to dis -
con nect. Yet on the morning of 15 February, the two 
other rigs on the Hibernia field were secure and 
largely intact while the Ocean Ranger had some -
how capsized. Coming less than two years after the 
rig Alexander Kielland had capsized in the North 
Sea taking 123 lives, this latest casualty focused 
international attention on the offshore drilling indus -
try, its technology and its methods of operation. 
In the days following the tragedy, as the bodies 
of twenty-two victims, wrecked lifeboats and 
other debris were pulled from the North Atlantic, 
Canadians and government and industry officials 
struggled to come to terms with the disaster. As with 
all maritime casualties, the loss of the Ocean Ranger 
immediately set in motion a series of in quiries, by 
the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) and the National 
Trans portation Safety Board in the United States, 
where the rig was registered,6 and by the Canadian 
gov ern ment. The latter marine casualty investiga -
tion became part of a much broader Royal Com -
mission of Inquiry reporting to both the federal 
government and the government of Newfoundland 
and Labrador. 
Of all the inquiries, the Royal Commission was 
the most comprehensive. It had a sweeping mandate: 
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to determine not only why the rig sank, but also why 
none of the crew were saved and to explore how sim-
ilar accidents could be avoided. Its investi gation 
was to “go beyond the realm of acceptable conjec -
ture or reasonable deduction based on circumstantial 
evidence.” It would use “scientific investigation to 
determine why in fact the Ocean Ranger, alone of 
three rigs on Hibernia, capsized and sank.”7 
So what happened to the Ocean Ranger on that 
tragic night? During a severe storm, a wave broke 
the glass window of a porthole in the ballast control 
room. Water soaked the ballast control console and 
it began to malfunction. The crew tried to assess the 
damage and made a number of attempts to repair 
the panel, but they were hampered by a lack of 
training, information and informed direction. Their 
counter-measures were not only unsuccessful 
but actually made the situation worse. By around 
0100, it was so serious — the bow was dipping 
down into the water at an angle of twelve to fifteen 
degrees — that the senior officer issued a Mayday 
and ordered evacuation.8 The evacuation, rescue and 
recovery attempts were also hampered by errors of 
judgement, design inadequacies and lack of proper 
training and equipment.9 The lifeboats and rafts 
were either inaccessible due to the angle of the rig 
or of no use in severe weather. The standby ships 
and helicopters were not designed for rescue and 
recovery; rather, they were equipped and crewed as 
supply and transport vehicles. The Ocean Ranger 
carried no survival suits.10 Autopsies on the recov-
ered victims revealed what everyone who knew 
the North Atlantic suspected: death by drowning 
while in a hypothermic condition.11 
Fig. 1 
The Ocean Ranger on 
the Hibernia oil field 
(Archives of Newfoundland 
and Labrador/Mobile 
Oil Canada Ltd, and 
G. & C. Associates) 
The Royal Commission concluded that the loss 
of the Ocean Ranger was not the result of one catas -
trophic failure of design or construction, or even 
an obvious human error. The design deficiencies, 
though numerous, could have been overcome by 
“competent and informed action by those on 
board.” But because of “inadequate training and 
lack of manuals and technical information, the 
crew failed to interrupt the fatal chain of events.” 
If, after the porthole had broken, the crew had “only 
closed the deadlights, shut off the electrical and air 
supplies to the panel, cleaned up the water and 
glass and then retired for the evening, the Ocean 
Ranger and its crew would have survived the storm 
that night.”12 
The Ocean Ranger Collection 
The collection of artifacts and archival materials 
donated to the Canada Science and Technology 
Museum is essentially a forensic one, made up of 
a large number of small articles and test samples. 
The material was either retrieved from the water in 
the days following the casualty or recovered from the 
rig during a series of dives ordered by the Royal 
Commission. Evidence retrieved as floating debris 
included a number of life preservers, an Emergency 
Position Indicator Radio Beacon (EPIRB), equip -
ment from the rig’s lifeboats and rafts — parts of 
survival kits, oars, a radio transceiver. The recovery 
teams also collected what was left of the lifeboats 
and inflatable life rafts. 
The artifacts recovered from the submerged rig 
were critical in explaining the loss. The commission 
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Fig. 2 
Billy Pugh life preserver; 
this life preserver was 
designed to turn an 
unconscious person 
face up in the water. 
(CSTM1985.0765.008) 
sent its divers to the ballast control room where 
they recovered three portholes, critical components 
of the ballast control system including parts of the 
control console, sixty-four solenoid valves, a large 
number of indicator lights and microswitches, and, 
finally, hundreds of pages of documents relating 
to the daily operation of the ballast control system 
and the rig generally.13 The Aviation Safety Bureau 
of Transport Canada tested these items and pro -
duced nine engineering reports on their findings. 
By studying the portholes, researchers deter -
mined which of the portholes had been broken 
during the storm. Air pressure tests showed that 
the porthole glass did not meet either the industry 
standard for strength or the thickness shown on 
the rig’s “as-built” plans. It also demonstrated that 
neither of these standards were sufficient to with -
stand wave forces that might occur in extreme storm 
conditions. They were developed for ships rather 
than drilling rigs anchored to the ocean floor. 
Careful examination of the condition and dispo -
sition of the solenoid valves demonstrated that the 
valves functioned normally and that brass rods had 
been used to manipulate eighteen valves manu -
ally; where the rods had been inserted, the valves 
were open, although it was clear that the operators 
had thought they were closing the valves with the 
rods. The researchers also carried out analyses of 
the recov ered ballast valve control switches and 
valve position indicator and pump switch lights 
on the con trol panel. These studies determined that 
sea water entering the ballast control panel had 
caused significant damage, where that damage 
occurred and how it affected what the operators 
saw as they tried to solve the ballast problem.14 
The Exhibit Challenge 
The story of the Ocean Ranger is a compelling one 
on a number of levels. Like all disasters involving 
the failure (or perceived failure) of technology, it 
forces us to confront our ambivalent feelings about 
technology and its central place in our lives. Muse-
ums of science and technology are naturally drawn 
to these types of stories because we believe it is our 
role to try to explain technological failures to the 
public, to help them come to terms with the confu-
sion, anxiety and fear that often follow in the wake 
of these catastrophic events. 
Disaster stories, though, also give rise to a forest 
of difficult and disorienting ethical and museolog -
ical issues that can cause museums to lose their 
sense of direction and purpose. The public seems 
to have an appetite for technological tragedies, old 
and new, and it is natural for museums to take advan-
tage of this. Ideally, they can use the popularity of 
these stories to attract visitors and, hopefully, to 
help them see beyond the disaster to some of the 
larger scientific, technological and social issues that 
explain and provide context for it. 
However, ethical problems can arise when 
muse ums are too preoccupied with popularity and 
attendance. Like everyone else in the public and cul-
tural sectors, they are under enormous pressure to 
generate more of their own revenue and, for many 
institutions, getting people through the door is the 
pri mary source of that revenue. It can also, for 
publicly-funded museums, serve as a justification 
for future funding. It is easy to be seduced by the 
argument that a really popular exhibit will help to 
fund less popular, but important work and attract 
new audiences, but experience shows that this 
strat egy can have some enduring and detrimental 
effects on museums that adopt it. 
Let’s take perhaps the most famous of all tech -
nological disaster stories as an example. The Titanic 
continues to fascinate millions of people and for any 
institution with T it a n i c -related artifacts, the temp -
tation to use them is overwhelming. The story is 
so widely known and the articles associated with 
it have such mystical power in and of themselves 
that museums needn’t spend much time or effort on 
interpretation. The Canada Science and Technology 
Museum, for example, owns an excellent sixteen-
foot model of T ita n ic that is a display unto itself, and 
it is one of the few artifacts that is never taken off 
the Museum floor. 
Giving in to the Titanic temptation, though, has 
caused some serious problems for museums in the 
last decade. One of the world’s preeminent mari -
time museums, the National Maritime Museum at 
Greenwich, became the subject of controversy in 
1996 when it decided to exhibit artifacts removed 
from Titanic by a company called RMS Titanic. 
These objects were retrieved in contravention of the 
1993 by-laws passed by the International Congress 
of Maritime Museums (ICMM). The signatories of 
those by-laws sought to protect submerged wrecks 
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as archaeological sites by refusing to “acquire or 
exhibit artifacts which have been…illegally salvaged, 
or removed from commercially exploited archaeo-
logical or historic sites.” The National Maritime 
Museum was not only one of the founding and 
leading members of the ICMM, it had helped to 
draft and had signed these by-laws. Only three years 
after doing so, however, the director of the museum 
found the potential to create a popular (and prof -
itable) exhibit too appealing to resist and decided 
to ignore the by-laws.15 
At the Maritime Museum of the Atlantic in Halifax, 
a more subtle problem arose. This museum has its 
own collection of Titanic artifacts and mounted an 
exhibit built around these in the late 1990s. It was 
not entirely clear why the museum, which has a 
rich collection and great expertise in subject areas 
more closely related to Canada’s Atlantic history, 
chose to devote resources to an exhibit on this topic. 
Many in the local and maritime museum commu -
nities, though, worried that the decision had too 
much to do with popularity and not enough to do 
with mandate and sound museological practice. 
The eventual inclusion of the inflatable Titanic 
slide as an added, temporary attraction could only 
have reinforced these concerns. The exhibit was 
an unparalleled commercial success, so much so 
that it has apparently created unrealistically high 
expectations in the director’s office. Will all exhibits 
now be judged according to the attendance and 
revenue figures established by Titanic? Will only 
those exhibits that promise similar popularity make 
it past the proposal stage? 
Despite certain obvious similarities, such as 
the location of the casualty and the careless use 
of the adjective “unsinkable,” the Ocean Ranger 
is, clearly, not in the same league as T i t a n i c . With-
out the enormous popularity and mystique of the 
topic, we are not subject to the same level of tempta -
tion when considering an exhibit. Nevertheless, 
some of the same concerns apply. Even if people 
don’t remember the Ocean Ranger tragedy, I have 
no doubt that, once reminded of it, many will want 
to look at items such as the life preservers, survival 
kits and lifeboat fragments just because they were 
t here on that tragic night. They might even fin d some 
numinous power in the more technical artifacts, 
some of which still bear legible markings indicating 
their origin. 
We could use the pieces of survival gear to tell 
our visitors the poignant story of how the standby 
vessel Seaforth Highlander came so close to recov-
ering a lifeboat filled with men, of how the ship’s 
crew watched helplessly as the boat capsized and 
how some of the men struggled to survive by cling -
ing to the overturned boat in the icy waters. We could 
Fig. 3 
A selection of items from 
a standard survival kit 
including a hatchet, 
weatherproof matches 
and a lifeboat checklist; 
searchers did not find the 
kit intact and the items 
retrieved may be from 






even make this display part of a thematic exhibit 
that purported to explain life-saving tech nol ogy 
and technique to give it greater museological le g iti -
macy, assuming we have the collection to support 
it. Or we could use the survival equip ment as a 
hook to draw people into an exhibit that explained 
the research behind the investigation, including that 
relating to emergency equipment and procedures. 
One way museums can avoid the pitfalls inherent 
in disaster stories is to stay focused on their social 
responsibility. As I noted earlier, technological dis-
asters, especially recent ones, are a very real source 
of public anxiety. In their aftermath, people have a 
legitimate need for explanations. Many of these 
come out in the investigations that follow these acci -
dents. Canada’s Transportation Safety Board, for 
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Fig. 4 (right) 
This portable marine radio 
transceiver was part of 
the standard emergency 
equipment found on the 
Ocean Ranger’s lifeboats. 
It is the only artifact from 
the collection that has been 
on display in the Museum. 
(CSTM1985.0767.001) 
Fig. 5 (top, right) 
Recovery crews found 
pieces of the Ocean 
Ranger’s inflatable liferafts. 
Those pictured here are 
samples of the joints of 
the rafts which, like the 
lifeboat samples, were 
tested to establish their 
precise strength. 
(CSTM1985.0776.003) 
Fig. 6 (middle, left) 
This large section of one 
of the rig’s two Harding 
lifeboats was recovered as 
floating debris along with 
other pieces, some of which 
were used by researchers to 
test the strength of the boats. 
(CSTM1985.0774.001) 
Fig. 7 (middle, right) 
Dive teams recovered three 
porthole frames from the 
submerged rig to help them 
determine how and why 
the glass in the ballast room 
porthole broke, leading to 
the malfunctioning of the 
control system. 
(CSTM1985.0768.001) 
Fig. 8 (right) 
A section of the mimic 
panel of the ballast control 
system used to control the 
pumps and valves that kept 
the rig balanced and stable. 
The susceptibility of this 
console to water damage was 
a serious design deficiency 
for a craft working in a 
marine environment. 
(CSTM1985.0777.002) 
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example, just released its final report on the loss of 
Swiss Air Flight 111, which crashed in Canadian 
waters in September 1998. It contains some fairly 
definitive answers to questions about what caused 
the fire onboard the aircraft and why the pilot did not 
attempt an immediate emergency landing. Both of 
these questions had been a source of public concern 
and speculation. 
Museums of science and technology, many of 
which were created with strong educational mandates, 
can also contribute to this process of expla nation. In 
some instances, we are ideally equipped to act as 
intermediaries between the researchers and the pub -
lic, to provide a simplified interpretation of complex 
scientific work and to put it into a broader 
chrono logical and thematic context. But we need 
to be very clear about what we are doing and why. 
Before thinking about creating an exhibit on the 
Ocean Ranger investigation or any other difficult 
topic, we have to ask ourselves some searching 
questions about the whole enterprise. 
1) Is this an important story in the history of 
science and technology? This is, of course, a highly 
subjective question. I find it helps to frame the 
ques tion in terms of three fundamental themes in 
the history of science and technology: the process 
and nature of technological change; how we under -
stand science and how it effects our lives; and the 
cultural and social meaning of science and tech -
nology.16 Using these themes as selection criteria, 
I believe we would be inclined to steer away from 
stories like Titanic, unless they could be framed 
in such a way as to deal directly with subjects such 
the disaster’s impact on ship design. The Ocean 
Ranger story is one of many examples of a techno -
logical failure caused by a complex chain of minor 
events involving design, training and regulatory 
inadequacies as well as human error. Like the 
Challenger, ValuJet and Swiss Air disasters,17 it 
warrants our attention as both a cautionary tale 
about the limitations of technology and, hopefully, 
a record of important lessons learned about this 
particular technology. 
2) If this story is important, is it one that has 
particular relevance and resonance for our insti -
tution and is it one that hasn’t been told effectively 
by other museums? Mandates are notoriously flex-
ible these days, with museums struggling to attract 
new and larger audiences and to generate revenue 
by any means possible. If a subject is popular but lies 
outside or on the periphery of a museum’s mandate, 
should it be considered and if so, should the level 
of funding reflect the relevance of the topic? This 
was one of the issues raised by the Titanic exhibit 
in Halifax. Being clear about why you are doing an 
exhibit and how it fulfills your institution’s duties 
and responsibilities is particularly important when 
dealing with difficult or controversial subject matter. 
The Canada Science and Technology Museum’s 
responsibilities include collecting, preserving and 
researching Canada’s scientific and technological 
heritage and sharing knowledge about that heritage. 
The Ocean Ranger story is relevant to the Museum’s 
mandate because it involves a technological failure 
that took place in Canadian waters and took the lives 
of sixty-nine Canadians. It is also relevant because 
much of the research work was carried out by 
Canadian scientists and engineers and because the 
results of the inquiry have had a profound effect 
on the offshore oil and gas industry in Canada and 
around the world. In this context, it seems to me that 
the most important of many stories the Museum 
could tell is the one focusing on the investigation. 
We ought to try to explain how researchers were 
able to piece together what happened on the rig 
that night. 
3) Is there an existing collection relevant to 
the story and, if so, do the artifacts serve readily 
and well the preferred narrative line? Under -
lying this complex question are some contentious 
Fig. 9 (left) 
This rod and bushing, part 
of the ballast control system, 
were used to control valves 
manually in the event of 
a failure of the automatic 
controls. Operators wrongly 
believed that inserting the 
rod closed the valves when, 
in fact, it opened them. 
(CSTM1985.0778.001) 
Fig. 10 (below) 
Researchers examined a 
number of ballast control 
switches to determine 
how water entered the 
panel and what its 
effects were on switches 
and indicator lights. 
(CSTM1985.0777.019, 
CSTM1985.0777.020) 
Fig. 11 (right) 
Hundreds of pages of 
documentation were 
retrieved from the rig 
by divers: technical 
drawing of one of the 
rig’s many complex 
control systems; 
stability report dated 
January 1982; logbook 
detailing daily activities. 
(CSTM1985.0780.001–133) 
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museological assumptions. We need artifacts to 
do an exhibit. Some museums and most science 
centres do exhibits without artifacts or with artifacts 
playing a very secondary role. But is this in the best 
interest of museums? In the intensely competitive 
cultural and recreational marketplace, museums 
are under increasing pressure to be “all things to all 
people,” by, among other things, building IMAX 
theatres and renting out facilities for functions that 
often disrupt both work and public access to the 
institution. In this context, it is easy to lose sight 
of what it is we do best and what it is that dis -
tinguishes us from the many other purveyors of 
information, education and entertainment out there. 
Museums collect artifacts and create exhibits 
by displaying them in a particular way and by pro -
viding them with physical and intellectual context. 
We offer people the opportunity to look at and inter -
act with three dimensional objects. They can see 
that these things have a particular structure, texture, 
style and size. They can understand them in the 
context we provide but they can also bring their 
own experience and interpretations to bear, looking 
at the artifacts in new and sometimes unexpected 
ways. We do this based on the premise that artifacts 
are historical documents, that is, that they contain 
information that can’t be found anywhere else. 
This makes artifacts and the exhibits built around 
them both a unique record of our past and a unique 
form of communication with the public. We always 
use other media to complement the artifacts but 
what really sets us apart is the interpretation 
of artifacts.18 
The second part of the question — do the arti -
facts serve readily and well the preferred narrative 
line — opens up another area of debate. Should 
artifacts be defined as I have defined them above, 
as essential, unwritten documents of our past that 
hold information that can’t be found in standard 
documentary sources? Or should they be more 
loosely understood and used as illustrations of our 
past, objects that complement and reinforce the sto-
ries we know from other, more traditional source 
material? Does it matter? 
I think it matters a great deal. Museums are in the 
business of collecting, conserving, storing, researching 
and interpreting artifacts. They do this to document 
the past and to share that past with the public, and 
it costs a great deal of money to do it properly. If 
arti facts are only useful as three dimensional illus-
trations, isn’t it fair for someone to ask why can’t 
we do without them or, at least, with out many 
of them? Surely we can make do with other, less 
demand ing and costly forms of illustration. 
This is a particularly important question for 
museums of science and technology. Institutions 
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like the Canada Science and Technology Museum 
are struggling to keep pace with technological change 
in dozens of fields. We are expected to collect, docu-
ment and interpret modern technologies many, if 
not most, of which are incredibly complex and 
often expensive. Yet many of these devices and sys-
tems have the generic, uninformative appearance 
of much modern technology. So how do we justify 
spending time and money collecting these artifacts 
if the information they contain is buried inside 
them and largely inaccessible to researchers and 
visitors alike? Would it not be more worthwhile to 
document and interpret these advances by obtaining 
the relevant manuals, photographs and diagrams 
or perhaps by interviewing the inventors? And 
might it not make more sense to present “inscru -
ta ble” technologies to the public in the form of a 
photo essay, a computer interactive, a book or 
a television program?19 
Now consider the Ocean Ranger artifacts. Clearly 
this collection is relevant to the story of technological 
failure but do the artifacts serve that story readily 
and well? And is it possible that other media might 
tell the story more effectively? 
Some of the Ocean Ranger artifacts are familiar 
enough objects — the life preservers, survival kit and 
emergency radio, for example. Taken together, this 
group of artifacts does tell us, quite poignant ly, that 
this was a marine disaster and that it involved a 
loss of life. No doubt for a select group — friends 
and family of victims, those who work on offshore 
rigs — some of these will have a numinous quality. 
That loss of life is, in part, what led to the compre -
hensive investigation of the casualty and of the 
off shore drilling industry. The one large piece of 
lifeboat that was recovered and which bears the 
name of the rig would also support this message 
though most visitors would not identify it on its 
own. So far so good. 
Now on to the forensic artifacts — the solenoid 
valves, the brass rods, the indicator light bulbs 
and the switches. Most of these are not readily 
identifiable or understandable; they are, in effect, 
de-contextualized20 scientific specimens that repre-
sent, but don’t document or even illustrate, the 
research done by scientists and engineers to dis -
cover the cause of the accident. Though some of 
the objects bear marks that suggest their role as 
test specimens, these don’t contribute much to our 
understanding of what the researchers did to them 
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and what crucial information they gained from the 
tests. In an exhibit, therefore, we would have to pro-
vide critical parts of the narrative — the process of 
scientific testing and reasoning — using media 
other than artifacts. Most of the objects would simply 
serve in a secondary, supporting role, as three-
dimensional illustrations. 
Would this be a bad exhibit? Not necessarily. 
The story would, I think, rely heavily on text, audio-
visual and interactive displays but this Museum 
is quite accomplished at using these media to con -
vey complex ideas and processes. We could also 
try to borrow one of the specially-built hydrody -
namic models used by researchers to analyse the 
movements of the Ocean Ranger during the storm.21 
These models are detailed and quite large and 
would help us to give visitors some kind of physical 
and spatial context for certain of the artifacts as 
well as a sense of overall rig design. We might even 
be able to show video of some of the testing that 
was done using these models. This would also make 
a dramatic addition to an exhibit otherwise domi -
nated by small objects and fragments of objects. 
It might be possible to communicate the message 
of design inadequacies by displaying a broken 
port hole in close proximity to the control console. 
A “mock-up” of the ballast control room showing 
the locations of the panels and their critical com -
ponents could help people make more sense of the 
forensic artifacts recovered from this area. But this 
would still leave us with the challenge of how to 
represent the scientific testing and reasoning that 
ultimately explained the casualty. Then there are 
the failures of training and of regulation, both of 
which are central to understanding what happened 
that tragic night in February 1982. 
Do I think we ought to try to create an exhibit 
using the Ocean Ranger collection? I think it would 
be an interesting and challenging exercise. And I 
think this sort of exercise would force any museum 
of science and technology to ask some hard ques -
tions about what and why they collect and how they 
make decisions about what to exhibit. These are dif -
ficult times for museums. As budgets decrease and 
competition for funds intensifies, we are increas -
ingly expected to justify not only our major decisions 
and expenditures but sometimes our very existence. 
More than ever, we need to be able to provide a clear 
and compelling explanation of what it is we do and 
why it matters. 
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